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Abstract Prospect theory is increasingly used to explain deviations from the tra-
ditional paradigm of rational agents. Empirical support for prospect theory comes
mainly from laboratory experiments using student samples. It is obviously important
to know whether and to what extent this support generalizes to more naturally occur-
ring circumstances. This article explores this question and measures prospect theory
for a sample of private bankers and fund managers. We obtained clear support for
prospect theory. Our financial professionals behaved according to prospect theory and
violated expected utility maximization. They were risk averse for gains and risk seek-
ing for losses and their utility was concave for gains and (slightly) convex for losses.
They were also averse to losses, but less so than commonly observed in laboratory
studies and assumed in behavioral finance. A substantial minority focused on gains
and largely ignored losses, behavior reminiscent of what caused the current financial
crisis.
Keywords Prospect theory · Loss aversion · Field data · Behavioral finance ·
Experimental economics
JEL Classification D81 · G11
1 Introduction
A central question in experimental and behavioral economics is whether findings
obtained in the lab can be replicated in more realistic settings. This study contributes
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to answering that question. We explore whether the findings on the psychology of
money and risk under prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman 1992), currently the most influential theory of decision under risk, can be
extrapolated from students in the experimental lab to financial professionals in the
field. There is abundant evidence about the capacity of prospect theory to account
for discrepancies from rationality in the lab, and these observations can be used to
explain many anomalies that are hard to reconcile with the traditional finance para-
digm.1 However, scant empirical evidence exists regarding the psychology of risk of
financial professionals. Do they also behave according to prospect theory? And, if so,
can we use one common specification of prospect theory that is applicable to students
in the lab and financial professionals alike or do we need different specifications of
prospect theory, one for risky choices in the lab and another for financial professionals
in the field?
There are several reasons why financial professionals might behave differently
from students in the lab. While the latter generally face one-shot independent choices
without any systematic feedback on uncertainty resolution, financial professionals are
provided with such feedback, and are evaluated on the basis of their overall perfor-
mance in a usual reference period. Moreover, financial professionals are trained to
diversify risks and to evaluate the contribution of an asset to their overall portfolio.
Several studies suggest that trading experience and opportunities for learning tend
to mitigate deviations from rationality (Myagkov and Plott 1997; List 2003; van de
Kuilen and Wakker 2006).
We measured prospect theory in a sample of financial professionals using a mea-
surement method that was recently implemented in the lab (Abdellaoui et al. 2007b).
Our professionals were private bankers and money managers handling $300 million on
average. Like us, Kliger and Levy (2009) and Gurevich et al. (2009) estimated prospect
theory using data from real financial actors. They used data from European options
based on the S&P 500 index and US options written on the stocks of 30 companies
leading the S&P 100 index, respectively. Their parameter estimates were consistent
with prospect theory although the degree of loss aversion was less pronounced than
typically observed in student samples.
Our article complements the analyses of Kliger and Levy (2009) and Gurevich
et al. (2009). Whereas they used real market data and were able to observe repeated
decisions over a period of 5 years, our method avoids some of the drawbacks of theirs.
First, we made no simplifying assumptions about prospect theory’s parameters. Sec-
ond, whereas their measurements only applied to aggregate data, we measured pros-
pect theory for each professional separately and, consequently, we could account for
preference heterogeneity, which was indeed clearly present in our data. Finally, both
Kliger and Levy’s (2009), Gurevich et al.’s (2009) and our estimations of loss aversion,
probability weighting, and utility curvature depend crucially on the assumption that
1 Examples are the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler 1995), the excess volatility and high
predictability of stock returns (Barberis et al. 2001), the value premium (Barberis and Huang 2001), and
the disposition effect (Barberis and Xiong 2009). Empirical studies confirming the predictions of prospect
theory for financial decisions include Thaler et al. (1997); Gneezy and Potters (1997); Gneezy et al. (2003);
Coval and Shumway (2005), and Haigh and List (2005).
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financial professionals behave according to prospect theory. We, therefore, included
several tests of this assumption. Our aggregate results are largely in agreement with
those of Kliger and Levy (2009) and Gurevich et al. (2009), despite differences in
methodology, and provide confidence in the external validity of their and our results.
We observed clear support for prospect theory. Our financial professionals did
indeed behave according to prospect theory and violated expected utility maximi-
zation systematically. They were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses,
had concave utility for gains and convex utility for losses, and overall they were loss
averse. However, their behavior deviated from the assumptions that are commonly
made in modeling financial decision-making under prospect theory in two respects.
First, our financial professionals were considerably less averse to losses than what
is typically observed in laboratory studies using students, and what is assumed in
behavioral finance. A sizeable proportion of the professionals were, in fact, not loss
averse, but displayed an opposite type of behavior, gain seeking. They focused mainly
on gains and downplayed the possibility of losses. Such behavior can be linked to the
current financial crisis. It has been suggested that the current financial situation may
have been caused by financial professionals ignoring the possibility of losses.2 The
second deviation was a violation of reflection, the assumption that utility for gains
and utility for losses have equal curvature. Utility for gains was significantly more
curved than utility for losses. Note that reflection is not central to prospect theory,
but is commonly assumed for convenience. Hence, the violations of reflection that we
observed do not entail a violation of prospect theory.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews prospect theory. Section 3
reviews Abdellaoui et al.’s (2007b) measurement method. Section 4 describes the
experimental method and stimuli used and Sect. 5 describes the results of our experi-
ment. Section 6 discusses our findings and concludes the article.
2 Prospect theory
Let (x, p; y) denote the prospect that pays money amount x with probability p and
money amount y otherwise. In our measurements, we will only use such binary pros-
pects involving at most two distinct money amounts. The decision maker’s preference
relation over prospects is denoted by. As usual,∼denotes indifference anddenotes
strict preference. The decision maker always prefers more money to less. A central
assumption of prospect theory3 is that outcomes are evaluated as gains and losses
relative to a reference point. Throughout the article, the reference point is denoted by
0. Gains are money amounts larger than 0 and losses are money amounts smaller than
0. A gain prospect involves no losses and a loss prospect involves no gains. A mixed
prospect involves both a gain and a loss. For gain [loss] prospects the notation (x, p; y)
implicitly assumes that x ≥ [≤]y. For mixed prospects, it assumes that x > 0 > y.
2 For example, due to myopia or as a result of their remuneration scheme.
3 Because we only use binary prospects throughout this article, the original version of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and the later version, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992) are equivalent. We will, therefore, simply use the term prospect theory in what follows.
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Prospect theory’s evaluation of prospects depends on the type of prospect under
consideration. Mixed prospects are evaluated as
w+(p)U (x) + w−(1 − p)U (y), (1)
where U is a utility function over money with U (0) = 0. The utility function U is a
ratio scale, meaning that we can freely select the utility of one money amount. The
functions w+ and w− are probability weighting functions for gains and losses, respec-
tively. The probability weighting functions are uniquely determined, are increasing in
probability, and satisfy wi (0) = 0 and wi (1) = 1, i = +,−. Gain and loss prospects
are evaluated as
wi (p)U (x) + (1 − wi (p))U (y), i = +,−. (2)
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) argued that utility is S-shaped, concave for gains and
convex for losses, and that probability weighting is inverse S-shaped, overweighting
small probabilities and underweighting moderate and large probabilities. Empirical
evidence generally confirms these assumptions (e.g., Abdellaoui et al. (2007b) and
Booij and Kuilen (2009) on utility and Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Abdellaoui (2000),
and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) on probability weighting). The degree of concavity
for gains is generally larger than the degree of convexity for losses. The exception is
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) who found equal curvature for gains and losses and
referred to this as reflection. Reflection is commonly assumed in applications of pros-
pect theory with many studies imposing the additional restriction that utility for gains
and losses is linear (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Barberis et al. 2001). S-shaped
utility and inverse S-shaped probability weighting jointly imply the fourfold pattern
of risk attitudes: risk aversion for probable gains and unlikely losses, and risk seeking
for unlikely gains and probable losses.4
A central assumption of prospect theory is loss aversion: people are more sensitive
to losses than to absolutely commensurate gains. There is considerable qualitative
support for loss aversion (e.g., Camerer et al. 1997; Tom et al. 2007) and it is the key
factor in explaining people’s attitudes toward risk (Rabin 2000).
However, the measurement of loss aversion is complex because it requires a com-
plete elicitation of utility on the gain and loss domains simultaneously. The difficulty
in completely measuring utility is that probability weighting for gains and for losses
can be different. Until Abdellaoui et al. (2007b), ABP from now on, there was no
method to measure prospect theory’s utility function without introducing simplifying
assumptions.
An additional complication in measuring loss aversion is that there is no consensus
about the definition of loss aversion. ABP (2007b) compared the main definitions
that have been proposed and concluded that the definitions of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005) were empirically the most useful. Kahn-
eman and Tversky (1979) defined loss aversion as −U (−x) > U (x) for all gains x
4 Under prospect theory, concave [convex] utility and risk aversion [seeking] are not equivalent due to
probability weighting and loss aversion.
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included in the domain, reflecting that losses loom larger than gains. A special case
of this definition is the requirement that loss aversion holds when −U (−1) > U (1).
This definition follows when a power specification is used for utility, as in Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) and also in Kliger and Levy (2009) and Gurevich et al. (2009).
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) defined loss aversion as the kink at the reference point
and suggested that the loss aversion coefficient should be defined as the ratio of the left
over the right derivative of U at the reference point. A similar definition was suggested
by Benartzi and Thaler (1995).
The best known quantification of loss aversion is by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
They adopted a variant of the definition of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and esti-
mated that the coefficient of loss aversion was equal to 2.25. This value has been widely
used in applications. Later studies that quantified loss aversion generally observed less
aversion.
3 Measurement method
Table 1, taken from ABP (2007b), summarizes their method for measuring utility under
prospect theory. The second column shows the quantity measured, the third shows the
indifference elicited to measure this quantity, and the fourth shows the implication of
this indifference under prospect theory. The final column shows the stimuli we used
in our experiment reported in Sect. 4. We will briefly describe ABP’s method. The
reader is referred to ABP (2007b) for a more detailed description.
The method consists of four stages. In the first stage, probabilities p and pg
are determined for which w−(p) = w+(pg) = 1/2, i.e., loss and gain probabil-
ities with decision weights 1/2. Under expected utility, where there is no probabil-
ity weighting, p = pg = 1/2. To determine p and pg , we first elicited losses
L0,L1, and L2 and gains G0,G1, and G2 that were equally spaced in utility units:
U (L0) − U (L1) = U (L1) − U (L2) and U (G2) − U (G1) = U (G1) − U (G0). As
explained in Table 1, two indifferences were needed to elicit losses L0,L1, and L2
and two indifferences to elicit gains G0,G1, and G2. Then subjects were asked to state
probabilities p and pg such that L1 ∼ (L2, p;L0) and G1 ∼ (G2, pg;G0). These
equivalences imply that w−(p) = w+(pg) = 1/2.5
In the second stage, the probability p was used to measure utility on the loss
domain [L1, 0], where L1 is the loss that has utility −1.6 This loss can be chosen arbi-
trarily because, as explained in Sect. 2, the utility function U is a ratio scale in prospect
theory. The measurement of U was performed through simple certainty equivalence
questions. Two losses, L A and L B with known utility, were chosen and we asked for
the loss Lr that made the decision maker indifferent to a prospect paying L A with
probability p and L B with probability 1− p, i.e., (L A, p; L B) ∼ Lr .7 This implies
5 By Eq. 2, L1 ∼ (L2, p;L0) implies that U (L1) = w−(p)U (L2)+(1−w−(p))U (L0). Rearranging
gives (1 − w−(p))(U (L0) − U (L1)) = w−(p)(U (L1) − U (L2)). The equality U (L0) − U (L1) =
U (L1) − U (L2) implies that w−(p) = 1/2. The conclusion that w+(pg) = 1/2 is derived similarly.
6 Throughout we denote a loss with utility −r as Lr and a gain with utility r as Gr , r > 0.
7 In the first question, we used L1 and L0 to determine L0.5. L1, L0, and L0.5 can then be used to determine
L0.75 and L0.25, etc.
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Table 1 Measurement method ABP (2007b)
Assessed quantity Indifference Under prospect theory Choice variables
Step 1
L1 (L1, p;L∗) ∼ (L0, p;L) U (L0) − U (L1) =
U (L1) − U (L2)
p = 0.33
L∗ = −$100
L2 (L2, p;L∗) ∼ (L1, p;L) L = −$600
L0 = −$1000
p L1 ∼ (L2, p;L0) w−(p) = 0.5
G1 (G1, p;G∗) ∼ (G0, p;G) U (G2) − U (G1) =
U (G1) − U (G0)
p = 0.33
G∗ = $100
G2 (G2, p;G∗) ∼ (G1, p;G) G = $600
G0 = $1000
pg G1 ∼ (G2, pg;G0) w+(pg) = 0.5
Step 2
Lr ∈ [L1, 0] Lr ∼ (L A, p; L B ) U (Lr ) = 0.5U (L A)
+0.5U (L B )
L1 = −$100,000
Step 3
 Ls ∼ (, 0.5; 0) w−(0.5)U () = −s s = 0.25
g 0 ∼ (g, 0.5; ) w+(0.5)U (g) = s
Gs Gs ∼ (g, 0.5; 0) U (Gs ) = w+(0.5)U (g) = s
Step 4
Gr ∈ [0, Gs ] Gr ∼ (G A, pg; G B ) U (Gr )=0.5U (G A)
+ 0.5U (G B )
that U (Lr ) = w−(p)U (L A) + (1 − w−(p))U (L B) = 1/2U (L A) + 1/2U (L B).
Consequently, Lr is the midpoint of L A and L B in terms of utility.
The third stage provided a link between utility for losses and utility for gains. It
started by selecting a loss Ls with known utility −s and then proceeded through three
indifferences to find a gain Gs such that U (Gs) = −U (−Ls) = s.
The fourth stage determined utility on the domain of gains [0, Gs] through similar
certainty equivalence questions as in stage 2 but now using the probability pg .
4 Experiment
Subjects were 46 financial professionals (median age 40 years, nine female). The low
number of female subjects was due to the scarcity of female financial professionals.
It was difficult to find professionals willing to participate in the experiment. The sam-
ple was collected using a “snowball procedure” where participants recommended us
to colleagues working in other institutions. Most subjects were private bankers, i.e.,
financial advisors responsible for managing clients’ investment portfolios. Some were
fund managers, i.e., portfolio managers in whose funds the private bankers invest.
They were affiliated with multinational financial institutions based in Cleveland OH,
123
Do financial professionals behave according to prospect theory? 417
Boston MA, New York, Atlanta GA, Phoenix AZ, and Beirut, Lebanon. In total there
were 24 professionals from the US and 22 professionals from Lebanon. They handled
between $20 million and $1 billion with a median of $300 million (mean $295 million).
None of the professionals were willing to disclose information about the performance
of their portfolios, deeming it confidential company information.
The experiment was computer-run. To minimize response errors and to be sure that
subjects understood the instructions, all interviews were conducted individually. They
were conducted in the professionals’ offices and took on average 30 min.
In the introduction to the experiment, the professionals were told that the choices
were designed to explore their attitudes toward risk, that their responses were confi-
dential, and that there were no right or wrong answers and, therefore, no reason not
to state their true answers. They were told that the choices represented investment
opportunities and that the amounts represented the company’s money. This wording
was chosen to make the choices realistic and insure that the choices made reflected their
preferences as professionals. This is different from most lab studies where choices are
usually framed in terms of subjects’ own money. We also informed the professionals
that they would be shown their measured utility function at the end of the experiment.
This provided strong motivation as they were curious about their results. We did not
mention the concept of loss aversion, nor did we tell them how their attitude toward
risk and their utility function would be measured.
Indifferences were elicited through a series of binary choices. We used a choice-
based method because previous research has shown that choices lead to fewer incon-
sistencies than matching, where subjects are directly asked for their indifference values
(Bostic et al. 1990). In the initial choice, the two prospects under consideration had
equal expected value. The next choices then zeroed in on the professionals’ indiffer-
ence values either by making the chosen prospect less attractive or by making the
prospect that was not chosen more attractive. Figure 1 gives an example of the way
choices were presented. To give the professionals an intuition for the probabilities
involved, we presented the options as pie charts with the sizes of the probabilities
corresponding with the areas in the pie charts. Professionals could choose by clicking
on their preferred option. They were then asked to confirm their choice. If they failed
to do so, the same choice was presented again.
The final column of Table 1 shows the stimuli used. We selected substantial amounts
of money to make the choices realistic. As a result, we could not play out the choices
Fig. 1 Display of the experimental questions
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for real and all choices were hypothetical. We return to the issue of incentives in the
discussion.
We elicited 11 data points for utility on the loss domain [−$100000; 0], L0.015,
L0.031, L0.062, L0.093, L0.125, L0.25, L0.375, L0.5, L0.625, L0.75, and L0.875, and eight
data points on the gain domain [0; G0.25]: G0.015, G0.031, G0.062, G0.093, G0.125,
G0.156, G0.187, and G0.25. We collected more data for losses to facilitate the oper-
ationalization of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition of loss aversion, and
many data points around zero to be able to operationalize Köbberling and Wakker’s
(2005) definition of loss aversion.
4.1 Tests of prospect theory
Because our estimations depend crucially on the validity of prospect theory, we
included several tests to verify whether the financial professionals behaved accord-
ing to prospect theory. As a first test, at the end of the experiment we elicited the
probability pr that made professionals indifferent to whether they received nothing or
whether they received the prospect (Gr , pr ; Lr ), r = 0.031, 0.0625, 0.125, and 0.25.
Remember that Gr has utility r and Lr utility −r . By Eq. 2 and the results derived
above, these indifferences imply that
U (0) = 0 = w+(pr )r − w−(1 − pr )r, (3)
and, hence, that w+(pr ) = w−(1 − pr ). This equality holds for all four values of
r. Because the probability weighting functions are increasing, the same probability
pr should be obtained in all four questions if the professionals behaved according to
prospect theory.
Our data also allowed for a second test to verify whether the professionals behaved
according to prospect theory. In the first stage of the measurement, we elicited losses
L0,L1, and L2 and gains G0,G1, and G2 such that U (L2)−U (L1) = U (L1)−U (L0)
and U (G2)−U (G1) = U (G1)−U (G0) (see Table 1). We only used these outcomes to
determine the probabilities p and pg for which w−(p) = w+(pg) = 1/2. They were
not used in the actual measurement of utility. However, we could check whether the
equalities between the utility differences were preserved in the measured utility func-
tion by using linear interpolation. If systematic deviations were to occur, then these
would indicate that our professionals did not behave according to prospect theory.
4.2 Methods of analysis
For each professional, we analyzed the shape of utility on the gain and loss domain
by looking at the evolution of the slope of utility. Both for gains and for losses, we
determined the change in the slope of the utility function when moving away from the
reference point. For gains, a decrease in the slope corresponded to concave utility, for
losses it corresponded to convex utility. In total, we had 11 observations on the slope
of utility on the loss domain and seven observations on the gain domain. To account for
response error, we classified a professional as convex [concave] for losses if at least 7
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out of 11 observations were consistent with convexity [concavity]. A professional was
concave [convex] for gains if at least four out of seven observations were consistent
with concavity [convexity]. These classification rules are based on empirical research
showing that choice reversal rates of up to 1/3 are common (Stott 2006).
In addition to the above nonparametric classification, we also analyzed the data
assuming parametric specifications of utility. We will report the data based on the
power family, which is commonly used in economics and finance. We also estimated
exponential and expo-power specifications (Abdellaoui et al. 2007a), but these yielded
similar conclusions and are, therefore, not reported separately. The power family is
defined by 0.25(Gr/G0.25)α for gains and by −(Lr/100000)β for losses. For gains,
α < 1 corresponds to concave utility, α > 1 to convex utility, and α = 1 to linear utility.
For losses, β < 1 corresponds to convex utility, β > 1 to concave utility, and β = 1 to
linear utility.
To operationalize Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition of loss aversion,
−U (−x) > U (x) for all x > 0, we computed the ratio −(U (−Gr ) / U (Gr )) for
the eight values of Gr that we elicited. This ratio can be interpreted as a loss aver-
sion coefficient. The −U (−Gr ) were in general unknown and had to be determined
through linear interpolation from the known values of U (Lr ). A professional was loss
averse if at least six of the eight values of the loss aversion coefficient exceeded 1,
and gain seeking if at least six out of eight values were less than 1. G0.25 exceeded
$100,000 for six subjects and we could not determine −U (−G0.25). For those subjects
we computed the ratio −(U (Lr ) / U (−Lr )) for the 11 values of Lr that were elicited
and classified a subject as loss averse [gain seeking] if at least eight out of 11 ratios
exceeded [were less than] 1. The reason for using a more stringent classification cri-
terion for loss aversion than for utility curvature was that the sequential nature of our
procedure made it more likely that if one response reflected loss aversion, the other
responses would also reflect loss aversion. For example, if G0.25 was much larger than
−L0.25, then the other Gr were also likely to exceed the corresponding −Lr .
Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definition of loss aversion implies that utility near
the reference point is steeper for losses than for gains. To operationalize their defini-
tion, we took the loss and the gain closest to the reference point, L0.015 and G0.015,
and computed the ratio of U (L0.015)/L0.015 over U (G0.015)/G0.015, i.e., we computed
G0.015/L0.015. A value of G0.015/L0.015 exceeding 1 indicates loss aversion, a value
less than 1 indicates gain seeking.
Significance of differences was tested both using parametric and nonparametric sta-
tistical tests. These typically gave the same results and therefore we will only report
the parametric results unless otherwise stated.
5 Results
5.1 Prospect theory
The professionals satisfied the consistency tests and behaved according to prospect
theory. In the first test, the median values of p0.25, p0.125, p0.06, and p0.03 were 0.71,
0.66, 0.71, and 0.69, respectively. As predicted by prospect theory, they were close and
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not significantly different (ANOVA with repeated measures, p = 0.17). Our second
test, the predicted equality between U (L0)−U (L1) and U (L1)−U (L2) and between
U (G1)−U (G0) and U (G2)−U (G1), also supported the hypothesis that professionals
behaved according to prospect theory. Neither U (L0) − U (L1) and U (L1) − U (L2)
(paired t-test, p = 0.65) nor U (G1) − U (G0) and U (G2) − U (G1) (paired t-test,
p = 0.06) were significantly different.
The median probabilities pg and p for which w+(pg) = w−(p) = 1/2 were
equal to 0.64 and 0.47. The probability pg was significantly greater than 0.50 (t-test,
p = 0.01), the value of pg predicted by expected utility; p did not differ signifi-
cantly from 0.50 (t-test, p = 0.86). These data suggest significant underweighting
of probabilities for gains around 1/2 and no probability weighting for losses around
1/2. Considerable variation existed at the individual level. The value of pg varied
between 0.19 and 0.98 with an interquartile range of [0.33, 0.79]. The value of p
varied between 0.06 and 0.96 with an interquartile range of [0.34, 0.63]. As we used
pg and p in the elicitation of utility, these values imply that for the large majority
of professionals no extreme probabilities, i.e., probabilities near 0 or 1, were used
in the choice questions. Probability weighting for gains was similar to that observed
in previous studies using student samples (e.g., Gonzalez and Wu 1999; Abdellaoui
2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000), but the pattern was different for losses.
5.2 Utility
5.2.1 Aggregate analysis
In agreement with the predictions of prospect theory, we observed risk aversion for
gains and risk seeking for losses.8 For gains, there were 232 risk averse answers,
89 risk seeking answers, and 1 risk neutral answer.9 The proportion of risk averse
answers was significantly higher than the proportion of risk neutral and risk seeking
answers (t-test, p < 0.001).10 For losses, there were 295 risk seeking answers, 207
risk averse answers, and 4 risk neutral answers and the proportion of risk seeking
answers was significantly higher than the proportion of risk averse and risk neutral
answers (p = 0.040). The proportion of risk averse answers differed significantly
between gains and losses confirming prospect theory’s assumption that risk attitudes
are sign-dependent (p < 0.001).
Figure 2 shows the utility function for the median data. The interrupted line shows
the case of linear utility. As predicted by prospect theory, utility was concave for gains
8 The median values for L0.015, L0.031, L0.062, L0.093, L0.125, L0.25, L0.375, L0.5, L0.625, L0.75, and
L0.875 were −1330,−2095,−4850,−7860,−10450,−24000,−33250,−46350,−58200,−70050, and
−82300, respectively. The median values of G0.015, G0.031, G0.062, G0.093, G0.125, G0.156, G0.187,
and G0.25 were 870, 1875, 4015, 6015, 10800, 13300, 17950, and 32350, respectively.
9 A risk averse [seeking, neutral] answer is defined as a response smaller than [greater than, equal to] the
expected value of the prospect.
10 To account for the fact that individual responses are likely to be correlated and cannot be treated as inde-
pendent, we estimated a random effects probit model using the pglm package in R. The reported p-values
are based on the t-tests corresponding to these estimates.
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Fig. 2 The utility function based on the median data
and convex for losses. Our data were not consistent with reflection, however. The
degree of curvature was more pronounced for gains than for losses. The utility for
losses was close to linear. Consistent with the deviation from reflection, the power
coefficients (the coefficients of relative risk aversion) differed significantly across two
domains. They were 0.93 for losses and 0.71 for gains (paired t-test, p < 0.01).
Figure 2 also shows the utility function under expected utility, i.e., when probability
weighting is assumed to be linear. The figure shows that our financial professionals
clearly deviated from expected utility. Wrongly assuming expected utility leads to
an overstatement of the curvature of utility: utility is too concave for gains and too
convex for losses. This overstatement of curvature is also reflected in the estimated
power coefficients. Under expected utility, the power coefficients were 0.57 for gains
and 0.70 for losses. Both coefficients differed significantly from those estimated under
prospect theory (paired t-test, p < 0.001 in both comparisons).
5.2.2 Individual analysis
The pattern of concave utility for gains and convex utility for losses was also observed
at the individual level. Table 2 presents the results of the non-parametric classifica-
tion. Twenty-seven professionals had concave utility for gains and convex utility for
losses. Only four professionals had the pattern traditionally assumed in economics
and finance of utility everywhere concave.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the individual power coefficients. Concave util-
ity was clearly the most common shape for gains. There were few subjects with
convex utility for gains. Slight convexity was the most common shape for losses, but
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Table 2 Non-parametric
classification professionals
based on the shape of their
utility function
Gains Losses
Concave Convex Mixed Total
Concave 4 27 11 42
Convex 0 1 3 4
Total 4 28 14 46
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Fig. 3 Distributions of the individual power coefficients for gains and for losses
a substantial fraction of subjects had concave utility for losses. We found considerable
variation at the individual level, in particular for losses. The power coefficients varied
between 0.36 and 1.54 with an interquartile range of [0.62, 0.98] for gains and between
0 and 2.18 with an interquartile range of [0.67, 1.20] for losses.
Reflection was also violated at the individual level. Under reflection, we would
expect a positive correlation between the individual power coefficient for gains and
the individual power coefficient for losses. However, this correlation was significantly
negative: ρ = −0.36 (p = 0.016).
5.3 Loss aversion
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the medians of gains and losses that have
the same absolute utility. We could compare six pairs (Gr , Lr ). According to Kahne-
man and Tversky’s (1979) definition, that loss aversion holds if for all x > 0, U (x)<
− U (−x), we should observe that for all r, Gr > Lr . That is, we should observe
that all points lie below the diagonal. This was clearly not the case. Gr and Lr were
approximately equal for smaller money amounts. The data were only consistent with
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) definition of loss aversion for larger money amounts.
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Fig. 4 The relationship between
median gains and median losses
with the same absolute utility
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Table 3 Individual results for
loss aversion Definition Loss averse Gain Median
seeking coefficient
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 18 13 1.31
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) 21 22 1.00
The data were not consistent with Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definition of
loss aversion either. Close to the reference point, utility was approximately linear and,
hence, loss aversion would imply that there we should find Gr > Lr . The data provided
no evidence for this prediction.
Table 3 presents the classification of the financial professionals based on the def-
initions by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and by Köbberling and Wakker (2005).11
Perhaps surprisingly, the data did not show strong support for loss aversion. The
proportions of loss averse and gain seeking professionals did not differ significantly
for both definitions (binomial test, p > 0.10 in both comparisons). The median loss
aversion coefficient under Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition indicated loss
aversion. It differed significantly from 1 (p < 0.001) and was similar to the values
obtained by Kliger and Levy (2009) and Gurevich et al. (2009). According to Köbber-
ling and Wakker’s (2005) definition, the median loss aversion coefficient was equal
to 1, corresponding to loss neutrality. The correlation between the values obtained
based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition and those based on Köbberling
and Wakker’s (2005) definition was low (0.14) and not significantly different from 0.
Figure 5 displays the distribution of the individual loss aversion coefficients for
both Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) and Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definition
of loss aversion. Once again, we observed considerable heterogeneity at the individual
level. The interquartile ranges were [0.79, 2.26] for Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
11 We also analyzed the data under the definition of Wakker and Tversky (1993) that at every loss, utility
should be steeper than at the corresponding gain. The results were similar, except that the number of subjects
who could not be classified was larger.
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Fig. 5 Distributions of individual loss aversion coefficients
Table 4 Median loss aversion
coefficients by country and sex Country Sex
US Lebanon Female Male
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 1.53 1.08 1.32 1.30
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) 1.01 0.67 0.69 1.00
definition and [0.24, 2.93] for Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definition. Depending
on the definition used, the interquartile ranges show that a quarter of the profession-
als weighed gains 1.25 to 4 times as heavy as losses. This contributed to strong risk
seeking behavior. Some professionals hardly paid any attention to losses and seized
any opportunity for a gain regardless of the losses involved.
5.4 Demographic characteristics
Table 4 shows that loss aversion was higher for the US-based professionals compared
to the Lebanon-based professionals. However, the differences were not significant
(paired t-test, p > 0.10 in both comparisons). The lack of significance may have been
due to the relatively small sample sizes. Loss aversion between females and males
was similar, but it should be kept in mind that we only had nine female subjects in
our sample. Older subjects tended to be more loss averse. The correlation between
age and loss aversion was positive (0.22) but insignificant (t-test, p = 0.15) based
on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition, whereas it was positive (0.48) and
significant (t-test, p = 0.001) based on Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definition.
5.5 Comparison with ABP
Table 5 compares our main results with those of ABP (2007b). When comparing these
results it should be borne in mind that the studies differ in several respects, but are
sufficiently close in terms of methodology and stimuli used to provide some insight
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Table 5 Comparison with ABP ABP This study Significance
Power gains 0.72 0.73 n.s.
Power losses 0.73 0.86 p = 0.031
Loss aversion 1.69 1.31 p = 0.049
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979)
Loss aversion 2.54 1.00 p = 0.044
(Köbberling and Wakker 2005)
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Fig. 6 A comparison between our sample of professionals with the student sample of ABP (2007b)
into the question whether the preferences of our financial professionals differed from
those observed using a student sample. The table shows that this was clearly the case.
Utility for gains was comparable, but the financial professionals had less convex utility
for losses (contributing to less risk seeking behavior for losses), and they were less
loss averse (contributing to more risk seeking in mixed prospects) according to both
definitions than the student sample in ABP (2007b).
The difference between our sample of financial professionals and the student sam-
ple of ABP (2007b) is further illustrated in Figs. 6A, B. Figure 6A shows the elicited
utility functions based on the median data. The figure shows that utility is almost
identical for gains in the two samples, but more convex for losses for ABP’s students
than for our professionals. The figure shows that the kink at 0 is larger for the stu-
dents, entailing higher loss aversion in the student sample according to Köbberling
and Wakker’s (2005) definition. Higher loss aversion for the students is also evident
in Fig. 6B, showing the relationship between median gains and median losses with the
same absolute utility. The interrupted line, showing the student data, lies everywhere
below the professionals’ uninterrupted line implying more loss aversion according to
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) definition.
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6 Discussion
Prospect theory has become an important tool to explain deviations from the classi-
cal paradigm of rational agents. However, the available support for prospect theory
comes almost exclusively from student samples and there is only scant evidence on the
preferences of professional actors in the market. This article addresses this gap in the
literature and presents quantitative evidence whether financial professionals behave
according to prospect theory and whether the prospect theory parameters commonly
observed in the lab and assumed in the literature reflect their behavior.
Our results support prospect theory. The financial professionals in our sample
behaved according to prospect theory and violated expected utility. They were risk
averse for gains and risk seeking for losses and their utility was concave for gains and
convex for losses both at the individual and at the aggregate level. Utility was more
curved on the gain domain than on the loss domain. The median professional was
loss averse, but less so than what is commonly observed in the lab and than what is
assumed in behavioral models of financial decision-making. This finding is consistent
with Kliger and Levy (2009) and Gurevich et al. (2009) despite the difference in data
and experimental methods used. One should keep in mind though that our experiment
was different from the typical lab experiment in some respects. In particular, to make
the choices realistic and to mimic their behavior as professionals, we told our subjects
that they were handling the company’s money, whereas subjects in the lab typically
make risky choices involving their own money.
Most models that apply prospect theory in finance rely heavily on loss aversion.
They assume a loss aversion coefficient of at least 2, implying that losses weigh at
least twice as heavy as gains. This strong degree of loss aversion is the main driving
force behind the explanation of several anomalous empirical findings. Our data did
not support such strong loss aversion. The assumptions used in behavioral finance
do not seem to capture the behavior of financial professionals and our data suggest
that using Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) parameters requires reconsideration when
wishing to model the behavior of financial professionals. Loss aversion plays a role
in explaining financial decisions, but it may not be as important as typically assumed.
It should be emphasized that our observation of lower loss aversion does not nec-
essarily imply that the assumptions used in behavioral finance are incorrect. Rather
we interpret our findings as providing a more complete picture of what drives finan-
cial market players. College students may be similar to private investors in that they
tend to make one-shot decisions and are less frequently exposed to feedback. Even for
financial professionals, our findings do not necessarily challenge models in behavioral
finance. For example, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) explain the equity premium puzzle
through a combination of loss aversion and frequent evaluation of portfolios. Based on
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) estimate of the coefficient of loss aversion of 2.25,
they conclude that investors use an evaluation period of approximately one year, a
period they call “plausible”. If loss aversion is lower, then the evaluation period must
be shorter to explain the equity premium puzzle. A shorter evaluation period may not
be implausible for financial professionals like the subjects in this study. In fact, some
of our professionals mentioned that they evaluate their portfolio every 6 weeks.
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We used hypothetical choices throughout the experiment. We could not use real
incentives because the stakes involved had to be large enough to make the decisions
realistic for our financial professionals. We do not believe that using hypothetical
choices affected our conclusions. First, most studies that address the issue of hypo-
thetical versus real incentives have found that the obtained patterns of behavior were
similar for the kind of task performed in this experiment (Beattie and Loomes 1997;
Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Bardsley et al. 2010) although some studies have observed
that real incentives can matter (Hertwig and Ortmann 2001). Second, time was very
valuable for our subjects, being highly paid financial professionals. The fact that they
were willing to respond to a variety of questions indicates that they took the tasks
seriously. Our computer program made it possible to show the elicited utility function
and its underlying psychology immediately after the interview was completed. Most
professionals were keen to learn about this and asked for a summary of the results to
be sent to them. When we explained the intuition of prospect theory after the interview
was completed, they agreed that prospect theory reflected the major aspects of their
decision-making process.
As mentioned before, we used sizeable amounts of money to make the choices real-
istic. However, perhaps the stakes were too small for our financial professionals who
are used to handling large amounts of money. On the other hand, most of our subjects
worked for commercial banks and typically handled transactions up to $100,000. We
can only speculate about the effect of high payoffs. There is some empirical evidence
suggesting that raising payoffs produces more risk aversion (Binswanger 1980; Holt
and Laury 2002). Under prospect theory, such risk aversion can be captured by more
concave utility, by less elevated probability weighting, or by more pronounced loss
aversion.
A critical element of prospect theory is the location of the reference point. Through-
out the experiment, we assumed that the reference point was 0, the case of no gain and
no loss. Our financial professionals may well have used a different reference point,
e.g., some target level of return. In defense of our assumption about the reference
point, we observed the usual risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses and
the shape of utility was consistent with the predictions of prospect theory.
Let us finally consider the question why we only observed limited evidence of
loss aversion. One explanation is that financial professionals have learnt to deal with
losses. Consequently, their assessment of losses is different compared to students, for
instance. A second explanation may be that the compensation package of financial
professionals often depends on achieved gains. This may induce more gain seeking,
or equivalently, less loss aversion. Typically, fund managers receive a management
fee of between 1 and 2% of the assets under management and an incentive fee of 20
and 25% of the profits of the fund. In addition, they receive a bonus when they beat the
corresponding index. Knowing which of these two explanations is true is important
for applications of prospect theory. The first explanation suggests that loss aversion
could be reduced through experience and, hence, would be less important in (frequent)
real-life decisions than lab data suggest. In the second explanation, experience plays
no role and does not affect loss aversion.
It should be kept in mind when interpreting our results that our sample size
was necessarily limited, because it was difficult to recruit financial professionals.
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Nevertheless, our findings caution against the use of estimates from student samples
in modeling the decisions of financial professionals. We hope that future studies will
keep this in mind and that our study will contribute to a more accurate modeling of
financial decisions.
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